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Abstract 
The proposed adverse impact of income inequality on health has long been an important topic in 
health economics. A negative correlation between inequality and health has been found in several 
empirical studies but the issues regarding causality and causes are yet to be resolved. The 
widespread theory that the effects on health goes via disinvestment in social capital and trust is 
heavily researched and highly debated.  
Many studies have found strong correlation between population health and income inequality using 
state level US data. Inconsistent results have been found using country-level data on mortality rates 
and income inequality in Europe or OECD. Using cross-sectional data it seems like the correlation is 
dependent on the countries/states chosen. The ambiguity of the results has led some researchers to 
disregard inequality as irrelevant when dealing with population health. Others have intensified their 
search for new evidence. 
In this study I exploit the fact that yearly estimates of the GINI-coefficient from 2004 and forth are 
available in the OECD database. It allows for the use of panel data regression with country-specific 
fixed effects to investigate whether the weak simple correlation observed between income 
inequality and population health in the OECD could be caused by identification problems. I find 
strong and significant results indicating that income inequality should indeed be accounted for when 
dealing with population health in OECD. The link between income inequality and health has 
important policy implications. 
Keywords: income inequality, health status determinants, health economics 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The proposition that the distribution of income have effects on health is the topic of a large and 
growing pile of literature in different fields of social science from the last decades. Results from a 
number of studies, on both individual and macro-level data show a negative correlation between 
income inequality and health (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 2000). However, the results are not 
unambiguous and the data problems are severe. 
OECD has contributed heavily to this research field, not only with reports and papers, but also with 
data collection from the member countries. However, in many studies, e.g. Jourmand et al (2008) 
and Lynch et al (2001), it is pointed out that in a European or an OECD context, the correlation 
between income inequality and health do not seem to be as great as in for example the USA. 
In this paper I will dig deeper into this particular issue and by the use of panel data from the OECD 
database test whether income inequality on the country level should be regarded as an important 
health status determinant within the OECD. In the OECD working paper “Health status determinants: 
Lifestyle, environment, health care resources and efficiency” (Jourmand et al 2008), the authors 
construct a model with important population health status determinants, although excluding income 
inequality from the model due to data paucity. They also argue that the weak correlations between 
income inequality and health, at those points in time where data are available, indicate that it 
probably do not belong anyway. 
The data set of the working paper mentioned is extracted from the OECD databases from 1981-2003. 
Nowadays however, dating back to 2004, the OECD database actually contains yearly estimates of 
the GINI coefficient from its member countries. This can be exploited to construct, however still 
rather short, panel data on health status determinants from the OECD database – including income 
inequality. The use of panel data regression can help resolve some identification problems in a 
simple correlation and can therefore give further leads to whether country level income inequality 
qualifies as an important health status determinant within the OECD context or not. 
The explanation behind the proposed link between income inequality and health are debated. Some 
argue that the correlation between income inequality and health is the effect of a concave 
production function of health from income (the marginal health benefit of an extra dollar is 
decreasing). Others argue that there is indeed something about the income inequality per se that 
affects health in a society (Wilkinson, 2010; Marmot, 2002). This is sometimes called the income 
inequality hypothesis (the IIH) and the effect on health is believed to run via effects on social 
relations and interpersonal trust. The argument goes that a more unequal distribution of income will 
cause increased gaps between people, making it harder to see yourself in others, and hence making 
interpersonal trust less likely. Trust, on the other hand, affects human interactions. In the 
marketplace trust will decrease costs of transactions, promoting business and growth, which have its 
own health effects. But the presence of trust or lack thereof is important in every interaction 
between people. Distrust will cause feelings of insecurity, worry and stress in a given interaction, 
which have adverse health effects (Schneider et al, 2011). 
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The evidence of such a link between income inequality via trust to health and growth is in large parts 
very compelling, but not unambiguous. In the theoretical part I will look a little deeper into the 
literature regarding this proposed link. 
In this paper I find that income inequality does belong as an important health status determinant 
within an OECD-context. My results from the empirical analysis show that there is a relatively large 
and significant effect running from income inequality to longevity, controlling for other important 
health status determinants. A 1 % increase in the GINI-coefficient corresponds to a 1,9 % decrease in 
longevity, or 1,5 years. The data sample of this study is however not very large and the results should 
therefore be regarded as preliminary. 
1.2 Purpose and question at issue 
The purpose of this essay is to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on whether income 
inequality should be regarded as an important health status determinant in an OECD context. 
The main questions at issue are: 
- What are the theoretical grounds to include income inequality as an important health status 
determinant? 
- Is there empirical support in an OECD context to include income inequality as an important 
population health status determinant? 
I also wish to provide some theoretical arguments why the possible health effects of inequality are 
important for economic policy in a broader sense. The questions are relevant for two reasons. First 
since there is an ongoing debate regarding the significance of income inequality in explaining health 
inequality. Second since availability of yearly data on the GINI coefficient in the OECD database 
provide an opportunity to better test the empirical support. 
1.3 Method 
I review (parts of) the literature on the correlation between income distribution and health 
outcomes. I put extra weight on the literature exploring the income inequality hypothesis. 
I collect data, mainly from the OECD database, on important determinants of health, including the 
GINI-coefficient, and analyze it using panel data regression. 
1.4 Material 
All data is collected from open databases, mainly from the OECD. Printed and unprinted sources are 
found in the bibliography. 
1.5 Delimitations 
The empirical study is made during the period where longitudinal data on income inequality can be 
found on OECD member countries. This time period is relatively short, 8 years long, and spans from 
2004-2011. 
1.6 Structure 
In chapter 2 I review the growing pile of literature on the health effects of income inequality. In 
sections 2.3-4 I look specifically at the literature on the so called income inequality hypothesis, 
emphasizing the importance of the trust concept to understand the mechanisms at work. In chapter 
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3 I discuss how the theory of market failures can be applied to the issue of income inequality and 
health.  Chapter 4 provides the estimation strategy and the results from the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 5 provides discussion and concludes. In appendix one, the reader can find some additional 
discussion on some of the conceptual issues involved in the measurement of income and income 
inequality. 
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2. The effects of income inequality on health outcomes 
2.1 Income and health 
Empirically income is positively related to health, both on an individual level and on a country level. 
The higher the income, the better the health, on average. Two common measures of health and 
income on a population level is life expectancy at birth and real GDP per capita. A curve with life 
expectancy on the y-axis and GDP per capita on the x-axis is commonly known as a Preston curve, 
named after Samuel Preston who first described it in Preston (1975). Figure 1a shows the relation 
between health and national per capita income (purchase power adjusted) in the 34 OECD countries. 
In the literature the Preston curve usually looks more like figure 1b (from Deaton, 2003), with larger 
circles for larger populations. Notably, there seems to be a positive relation between health and 
income, but it is nonlinear.  
Figure 1a. Life expectancy and GDP per capita 2010. Source: OECD 
Figure 1b. The Preston curve. Source: World Bank (from Deaton, 2003) 
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Preston reasoned about the non-linear relationship (Preston, 1975, p 241-242): 
When individual-level factors are pertinent in mortality and when the individual-level dose- response 
relations are non-linear, as they almost certainly are in this case, then the distribution of income will 
affect the aggregate life expectancy. If the dose-response relations were all linear and identical from 
individual to individual and nation to nation, it is easy to show that a nation with a particular average 
income would have the same life expectancy regardless of how incomes were distributed. 
Preston’s reasoning thus suggests that the non-linear correlation on the population level is a 
reflection of a non-linear correlation on the individual level. It turns out that this prediction was 
head-on. Individual level data from later studies confirm the positive and non-linear relation 
between income and health also within countries. In figure 2, this is exemplified by a result from the 
Great Britain, borrowed from the Marmot review of 2010 (Marmot et al 2010). 
We see in the figure that persons living in lower income neighborhoods (to the left on the horizontal 
axis) do indeed on average live shorter lives (further down on the vertical axis) than persons living in 
higher income neighborhoods. The pattern, that persons living in higher income neighborhoods1 is 
expected to live longer, would be similar regardless of the country chosen. 
Figure 2 – Within country income-health correlation, Source: Marmot et al (2010) 
Whether the correlation in figure 2 represents a causal relation, and if so in which direction causality 
goes, has long been topic for debate and research. Income can affect health in a number of ways. 
Jourmand et al (2008) argues that on a country level, a higher GDP per capita will facilitate better 
access to goods and services that improves health and longevity, e.g. food, housing and 
transportation. But it may also reflect different working conditions in richer and poorer countries, 
where richer countries tend to have a higher share of less health damaging jobs in the service sector 
(p. 28). On an individual level income may affect health in two ways, which following Marmot (2002), 
can be labeled “poor material conditions” and “lack of social participation”. Obviously higher income 
will permit a higher consumption of goods that are necessary for good health, like clean and healthy 
                                                          
1 This of course is a proxy for people with higher income. 
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living conditions, food, clothes and medicine. But looking at figure 2, we see that it seems like income 
affects health far beyond the level of income that would ensure the possibility of consuming some 
“healthy” level of these goods. This could then not be the effect of poor material conditions, but 
must be caused by some other mechanism. Marmot (2002) argues that above this threshold, “there 
still could be substantial inequalities in health that are related to differing opportunities for social 
participation, for leading a fulfilling and satisfying life, and for control of one’s life” (p. 32).  
This view, that it is not only income per se, and the enhanced consumption possibilities for 
individuals, but also the effect income has on human interpersonal relations and activities that 
affects health outcomes,  is important when dealing with the health effects of income inequality and 
trust. It is also highly debated. 
Notably, given that citizens in richer countries today most often have good access to necessities like 
clean water, food and health care, the lion part of the income related health inequalities within OECD 
cannot reasonably be explained by poor material conditions in this regard. 
Even if most would agree that there is some causal relation running from income to health, causality 
is very likely to be bi-directional. Obviously good health will help in pursuing a long education and a 
high status job. On the other hand bad health can lead to early retirement and people leaving the 
workforce, which has a negative impact on income. Jourmand et al (2008) argues that the reversed 
causality problem is less of an issue when dealing with the macro level, at least when dealing with 
developed countries, as is the case in this paper. This particular argument is left unsupported and is 
not a literature consensus (see e.g. Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2011). 
2.2 Income inequality and health 
Besides the income levels of nations and of individuals, the distribution of income within a given 
society is from multiple studies empirically linked with average health outcomes. Many of these 
however are performed within the USA. Performing similar studies with data from other countries 
commonly yield ambiguous results (Lynch et al 2001). The most common measure of income 
distribution in a country is the GINI-coefficient (see appendix 1), running from 0 to 1, with 0 
corresponding to total equality of income (everybody earns the same amount of money) and 1 
corresponding to maximum inequality (one person earns 100 % of all income). Figure 3a depicts life 
expectancy and GINI-coefficients in OECD 2010. 
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Figure 3a Life expectancy and income inequality 2010. Source: OECD 
 
Figure 3b Life expectancy and income inequality, excluding former communist countries. Source: OECD 
What is noted in figure 3a is that the correlation is rather weak, since the variance is quite large2. It is 
often argued that income inequality affects health mainly through disinvestments in social capital 
and trust (Uslaner 2002). Therefore it is interesting that Morrone et al (2009) observed in a similar 
fashion that social capital, measured using interpersonal trust as a proxy, do not seem to have as 
large effects on health in OECD as in a pure US context (p 30): 
At the OECD level, there is only a weak connection between these two variables [interpersonal trust 
and age-adjusted mortality] and data doesn’t reproduce the same linear pattern showed by Kawachi 
et al in their study of US states. Many countries, such as Mexico, Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak republic, have very high level of mortality in comparison to their level of interpersonal trust. 
                                                          
2 Obviously, this is why income inequality was disregarded as irrelevant in Jourmand et al (2008). 
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Looking again at figure 3a it is indeed noted that the former communist states do not seem to 
comply with the stated theory of income inequality and health. If we exclude these countries, which 
may or may not be advisable for a number of reasons, this results in Figure 3b. 
When the former communist states are excluded from the sample, we are left with an explanation 
power of 35 %. Of course, one may then wonder, what other countries should we exclude just to 
strengthen (or weaken) the argument? Following the reasoning of Marmot (2005, p 190ff), exclusion 
may actually be the way to go. Marmot argues that the situation in the former communist states in 
fact strengthens the general argument regarding inequalities and health. Laying out the hypothesis 
(mentioned above) that the effect on health goes via lack of control and lack of participation; he 
shows that this is exactly what is missing for large parts of the population in these countries3. 
For our purpose it is sufficient to note that the weak correlation between income inequality and 
health in an OECD context, laid forward by many, is very much influenced by what is going on in the 
former communist states. The inclusion of country fixed effects in a panel data regression may be an 
important contribution in this regard. 
The empirical relationship found in many studies and in figure 3b states that the more unequal the 
distribution of income in a given society, the worse health outcomes, on average. Thus the same 
national (per capita) income in two countries will on average not give the same population health 
outcomes, rather it will depend on how this income is distributed among individuals and households 
within countries. Why is this? 
There are some different theories and approaches to how income inequality affects health 
outcomes. In a literature review, economists Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) summarized the 
different suggested theories and put them into five main categories. They were the absolute income 
hypothesis (AIH), the relative income hypothesis (RIH), the deprivation hypothesis (DH), the relative 
position hypothesis (RPH) and the income inequality hypothesis (IIH).  
The AIH states that what seems to be the effect of income inequality is rather an effect of a concave 
relationship between health and income. There are diminishing returns to income in the production 
of health. The implication, shown in figure 4, is that taking 100 dollars (or whatever amount) from a 
high earner and giving it to a low earner, will yield a positive health effect at the society level, simply 
because of the shape of the production function. But it is still the income of the individual, and not 
the income distribution, that affects individual health4. 
                                                          
3 Which relates to the rather extreme political and economic history that these countries have in common. 
4 Note that this is exactly what Preston suggested, as we saw earlier. 
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Figure 4. Implications of the concavity of the health-income relationship. Source: Wagstaff and Doorslaer 
(2000), p 546 
The latter four theories all state that income distribution have its own health effects, and that not 
only absolute income matters, but also some relative measure. Put differently, it is not only your own 
income that matters for your own health, it is actually also the income of others. Clearly, if true, this 
effect cannot go through poor material conditions. It must be working through some other 
mechanism.  
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2000) show that the different theories on what this mechanism might be 
yield different health functions for individuals. The RIH states that health is associated with relative 
income per se, i.e. the deviation of individual income from income mean in a given reference group. 
The DH states that adverse health effects will occur if individual income and hence living standard 
falls below some critical level, or poverty line5. The RPH states that it is not the income deviation 
from mean income, but rather a person’s rank on the income scale that matters. Finally the IIH states 
that income inequality in itself has adverse health effects for everyone, in that it causes 
disinvestment in social capital. It should be noted that none of the above theories are mutually 
exclusive and might all bear a piece of the truth. If relative income matter, probably absolute income 
do too, and the effect of the relative income may be manifold. 
The main contribution of the paper is the insight that to discriminate between different theories, one 
must use individual level data and cannot rely on population level or community level data. This is 
since all of the theories predict that population health will depend on average population income 
and income inequality6. It is only with data on individual income that we can investigate further 
whether it is the absolute income, the deviation from mean or the rank that matters for individual 
health outcomes. 
Reviewing the literature (back in 2000) Wagstaff and Doorslaer find strong evidence for AIH, some 
evidence for DH and IIH, and nothing to support RIH and RPH. Also striking is that every study 
mentioned in the review do find, whatever the cause, the same correlation between higher income 
inequality and worse health.  
                                                          
5 E.g. 50 % of median income. 
6 In addition, of course, to any other health determinant that we can think of. 
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In a more recent study emphasizing the cross-country perspective and using a dataset with 
information on 16 000 individuals from 21 countries, Karlsson et al (2010) find strong support for the 
RIH and the IIH, although they conclude that the IIH seems more of a high-income country 
phenomenon. Specifically they find evidence of heterogeneity in the way income inequality affects 
health in different countries, mostly depending on level of development. 
Since I am dealing with population (national level) data in this essay I do not aim to try to 
discriminate between the different theories with my empirical results. To make the point that 
income distribution matters for population health it is sufficient to show a significant correlation 
between the two7. For policy decisions this may not be enough. For making policy the link matters. 
For comprehensiveness8 I will in the next section further pursue the debate and research on the 
proposed links, focusing on the income inequality hypothesis where disagreements in the literature 
have been the largest. 
If any of the four relative income theories tell some part of the story, that effect is most probably 
mediated through some effect of inequality on human relations. Not unlikely (and often argued) that 
effect is what is caught in the concept of social capital and trust to which we now turn. 
2.3 Trust, inequality and health 
 
Interpersonal trust is commonly used as a proxy for the perhaps a little fuzzier concept of social 
capital (Morrone et al 2009). The concept of social capital is not distinctly defined across the 
literature. In his paper Bowling alone (1995), Robert Putnam states that social capital “refers to 
features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit.” The Swedish political scientist Bo Rothstein, states that social 
capital has a quantitative dimension as well as qualitative, where the former refers to the number of 
social connections between individuals and the latter to the level of trust embedded in those 
connections (Rothstein 2002). 
 
Trust can be broadly defined as the tendency of trusting other people to do as we expect them to do 
(Morrone et al, 2009, p. 5). The most common measure of trust is responses to the so called 
Rosenberg question (Ibid, p 10), which goes like this: “Generally speaking, do you think most people 
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The percentage of the 
respondents who think that most people can be trusted differs greatly across countries and 
correlates positively to other measures such as income9 as seen in Figure 5. 
                                                          
7 Preferably one that is stronger than the one in figure 3a. 
8 And because it is truly an interesting debate and research field. 
9 Intuitively trust in other actors in the market will lower costs of transaction, since the need for control 
mechanisms will decrease. This is an obvious link between trust and growth. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of responders who agree that “Most people can be trusted” and GDP per capita, 2008 or 
closest year available. Source: OECD  
Uslaner (2002) shows that this particular relationship is much stronger on a national level than on an 
individual level, where different measures of optimism are better predicators of trust than income. 
Within the field of political science a lot of research has been made to explore and understand the 
causes of a strong social capital and of interpersonal trust. Putnam viewed the civic society as the 
most important producer of trust and social capital. Using individual level data from USA, Uslaner 
(2002), finds evidence that membership in an organization in fact do not increase trust levels. This is, 
he argues; because a lot of organizations are built on the exclusion of others on e.g. religious, 
political or ethnic grounds. He goes on to show that individual income level too is a bad predictor of 
social trust. Instead it seems like optimism and control in life are the best predicators of propensity 
to trust others. 
Returning to the issue of income inequality and population health, trust do not just correlate with 
total income, it is also highly correlated with income inequality as measured by the GINI index. This is 
shown in Figure 6. Looking at cross-national data, Uslaner (2002) concludes that income inequality is 
the strongest determinant of interpersonal trust within a country (p. 22). There are two reasons that 
more equal economic conditions links to higher trust levels. First it fosters optimism about the 
future, in the sense that people become more optimistic that they too can share the wealth of the 
society. And, as Uslaner shows, “optimism is the basis of trust” (p. 22). Second, equality creates 
stronger bonds between different groups in society, a sense of a shared fate. Inequality, on the other 
hand, makes people view others as very different from themselves and this makes people less likely 
to trust each other. 
Trust is also strongly correlated with health, measured as the life expectancy, which is shown in 
figure 7. The more trust, the longer lives. The question is whether this is a spurious relation, 
reflecting trusts positive effect on GDP (or some other variable) or if there in fact is a causal link 
between trust and health outcomes. If there were, this could indeed be an important factor 
explaining the relation between income inequality and health outcomes. 
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Figure 6 – Trust and income inequality in OECD 2007/08, Source: OECD 
 
 
Figure 7 – Trust and life expectancy Source: OECD 
 
There are in fact many studies on the topic of income inequality, trust and health. Barefoot et al 
(1998) performed a study on a sample of 100 Americans aged 55-80 where cross-sectional data 
confirmed the association between trust10 and (self-rated) health and life satisfaction and where a 
mortality follow up 14 years later confirmed a higher survival rate among the high trusters. The 
authors conclude that the trust concept is important to understand successful and healthy aging.  
Kawachi et al (1997) perform a pathway analysis11 on social capital as the mediating link between 
income inequality and mortality in 39 states in USA. They use group membership (civic participation) 
                                                          
10 Here measured with the Rotter interpersonal trust scale where the respondents are asked to agree or 
disagree on a 5-graded scale to 25 statements. 
11 see e.g. Pedhazur (1973) 
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and interpersonal trust as measures of social capital and the so called Robin Hood index12 as the 
income inequality measure. The results from the path analysis indicate that the effect from income 
inequality on health is mediated through disinvestment in social capital13. This result, as noted by 
Wagstaff & Doorslaer (2000) is highly contradictional to the absolute income hypothesis, which 
states that there is no such link, just a concave production function. It is more in line with the income 
inequality hypothesis, that income inequality in itself causes bad health14. 
 
Another suggested link between income inequality and health is that income inequality inhibits or 
reduces public spending on services (like health care) and infrastructure that promotes health. Elgar 
(2010) examines this link. In a study that in large parts resembles the Kawachi et al (1998) he 
performs two pathway analyses to see which link is the strongest – via public expenditures or via 
disinvestments in social capital. He finds no evidence of a link going through public health care 
expenditures but strong evidence of a link going through interpersonal trust15. 
 
Schneider et al (2011) look closer into the actual effects on physical health from trust and distrust. 
They study the effects of interpersonal trust and distrust within the setting of a romantic 
relationship. They follow 187 couples over a period of 14 years. The main finding is that low trust in 
one’s partner causes anxiety and depression, which over time will translate into worse physical and 
self-reported health, and finally into increased mortality rates. The suggested reason is captured 
within this quite intuitive passage (p 669): 
 
We suggest that when individuals enter into diagnostic interactions with trusting expectations, they 
feel relatively more secure and relaxed about the interaction. For example, when Mary knows that 
she can rely on John to be responsive to her needs, she is likely to feel more relaxed during 
conversations about their plans – not only their plans for Thursday evening, but their plans for life. In 
contrast, distrustful expectations should be associated with insecurity and anxiety. For example, when 
Mary knows that John is unlikely to be responsive to her needs – when she believes that he is likely to 
place his personal interests above her needs and the needs of their relationship – such negative 
expectancies are likely to yield unease and worry. 
 
And while the setting here is a romantic relationship; this line of reasoning is easily transmitted to 
any (important) interaction between people. The mediating link between distrust and physical health 
is likely to be the same, and it seems to be via anxiety and depression, i.e. worse mental health16.  
 
                                                          
12 See appendix 1. 
13 Both income inequality and trust (social capital) is strongly correlated to mortality, the size of the gap 
between the rich and the poor are powerfully and negatively related to level of (dis-)investment in social 
capital and the path coefficients from the pathway analysis strongly suggest that social capital act as a 
mediating link between income inequality and mortality. 
14 But as we remember, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
15 Although he concludes that the effects via trust cannot account for the entire effect from income inequality 
on health. 
16 Anxiety and depression are widely known to be significant predictors of, for example, cardio-vascular 
diseases. Marmot (2005) show that increased mortality in cardiovascular diseases is indeed related to 
economic inequality, and is even the main explanation why economic inequalities cause health inequalities. 
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The advocates of the income inequality hypothesis thus argue that an important link between 
income inequality and health is that inequality causes disinvestment in social capital and that this in 
turn affects health. Low trust, i.e. distrustful expectations on human interactions, causes stress and 
mental illness which in turn affects physical health and mortality. Like this: 
 
Income inequality → Disinvestments in social capital → Mental illness → Physical illness → Increased 
mortality 
 
Adding to this the view that trust is also connected to more efficient markets and growth, we find a 
second link: 
 
Income inequality → Disinvestments in social capital → Lower income (GDP per capita) → Increased 
mortality 
 
But everyone is not convinced. 
2.4 The sceptics 
As mentioned many of the results regarding the causality running from income inequality and health 
have been questioned and challenged by a number of studies. Although some of the results above 
can be quite convincing, the issue remains unresolved. 
Lynch et al (2001), using data from 16 industrialized countries find no significant correlation between 
income inequality and cause-specific mortality rates, self-rated health or life expectancy. Only infant 
mortality was significantly and positively correlated with inequality. The authors conclude that earlier 
findings by e.g. Wilkinson (1992) are a statistical artefact, dependent on the countries chosen. 
In a short text in British medical journal, Mackenbach (2002), points to the results of Lynch et al 
(2001), but also several others, concluding that what once seemed like an open and shut case for 
some effect running directly from income inequality to health is now suffering from most of the 
evidence dissipating. Remaining is the effect running from income to health – in a curvilinear 
manner. 
Deaton (2003) reviews the theory and the evidence in a long article and concludes that the evidence 
do not support any effect from income inequality per se to health. Several studies from USA have 
strongly suggested otherwise, but Deaton finds that this is almost certainly an effect from something 
that is correlated to income inequality, but is not income inequality itself. Supporting his conclusions 
is for example a historical pattern of mortality and inequality in USA and Britain in the mid-1900s that 
do not fit the theory. In the end it is the extent of poverty that affects health and the proposed link 
between income inequality and population health is merely an artefact of that high inequality 
indicates a higher share of poor people17. This and perhaps that the link between income and health 
is nonlinear. 
Cutler et al (2006) set out to determine the causal relation between income and health using mainly 
a historical development approach. The main conclusion is that it is differences in the political 
                                                          
17 Notably this finding seems to be in line with the Deprivation hypothesis, while contradicting the Income 
inequality hypothesis. 
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willingness and institutional ability to implement new technologies that determine the health 
inequalities between countries – neither of which is an automatic consequence of rising income. The 
causal effect therefore runs from health to income, while the reverse is downplayed. While the 
authors do admit that the evidence is weak and even missing in parts, the conclusion would, if 
correct, exclude the possibility of income inequality being an important explanation to population 
health. It is in this case the availability to new health technologies and medicine that explains 
differences in mortality rates, which certainly can be correlated to income inequality, but is not 
income inequality per se (compare Deaton’s conclusions above). 
Lorgelly and Lindley (2007) explore a large individual data set from the British Household Panel Study 
(BHPS) to find evidence to the RIH and IIH and find none, again only the AIH is confirmed. 
The above studies, and many more, either questions the correlation between income inequality and 
population health per se, or questions that there are any causal effect between income inequality 
and life expectancy that depends on something that is created by income inequality, e.g. 
disinvestment in social capital and public goods. 
To summarize: Income and income inequality have been shown in several studies to be strongly 
correlated to health. It has been highly debated whether the results represent a causal relation or 
not. Most disagreements have been surrounding the income inequality hypothesis, that income 
inequality per se has societal adverse health effects. Many studies confirm a causal relation running 
from income inequality via lower interpersonal trust to worse health, but they are not unambiguous. 
There is a stronger literature consensus on the absolute income hypothesis. 
If income inequality has effects on health and trust (regardless of how this happens), and these 
features have positive effects on growth, this is an important part of the puzzle regarding the 
sometimes highlighted negative correlation between income inequality and growth18. In the next 
chapter I will sketch down the arguments of why the proposed health effects of income inequality 
may be important for economic policy in a broader sense. 
  
                                                          
18 Note e.g. the recently published and much talked about paper by Cingano (2014). 
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3. Income inequality and efficiency 
3.1 A big trade-off? 
“The conflict between equality and economic efficiency is inescapable.” (Okun, 1975) 
The quote above is from the book, “Equality and efficiency – the big trade-off”. In it, Arthur M. Okun, 
proposes a leaky-bucket game to help establish anyone’s preferences regarding income 
redistribution. It goes like this: If an income tax is imposed on the top 5 % in the income pyramid and 
is distributed to the bottom 20 % - this will mean an increase in the income of the poor households 
by $1000. (Which should be compared to average income of $45000 and $7000 respectively in 1974). 
The problem is that the money has to be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket. And the 
task of the game is to determine how much leakage would be acceptable. The leakage of money 
during the transfer is of course meant to represent the adverse effects on incentives to work and 
invest that such redistribution scheme will cause. So the actual amount received by the poor families 
is not $1000, but some smaller amount, depending on the size of the leakage. And the economy as a 
whole will as an effect get smaller. Being a proponent of increased equality in America, Okun himself 
states that he would support the transfer up until 60 % leakage, in this particular example (from the 
richest to the poorest in the income distribution.) Those who have no preferences towards equality 
will of course never support such governmental intervention and those who have no preferences for 
efficiency would support the transfer at any leakage less than 100 %. Everyone else will end up 
somewhere in between. 
While the game, although hypothetical, is intriguing, it might be that we do not have to play it like 
this. The downward sloping curve in figure 8 tells another story. It actually says that inequality may 
be bad for growth.  
Figure 8: Income inequality and GDP per capita 2011. Source: OECD 
In a recently published paper Federico Cingano (2014), shows that increasing economic inequalities 
in the OECD the last 30 years have had adverse effects on growth. He also finds evidence that 
disinvestments in human capital (education) is one important channel through which inequality 
harms growth. In previous chapter I provided some of the evidence that disinvestments in health and 
social capital may be other channels. For an economist the natural way to think about this is to 
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consider the income distribution as a public good, or the effects of income inequality as a negative 
externality. 
3.2 The income distribution as a public good 
The view that the income distribution can be seen as a public good is certainly not new. The oldest 
article on the subject that I can find is Thurow (1971). He notes that the income distribution meets all 
of the tests of a pure public good. “Exclusion is impossible; consumption is non-rival; each individual 
must consume the same quantity.” (p. 328-329) And of course everyone has an interest of disguising 
their own true preferences in order to avoid paying their share of the income transfers needed to 
increase equality. 
 
There are two ways to think of the production of equality in the efficiency sense. One way is to think 
of it as a matter of mere taste; something that turn up in people’s utility functions and therefore 
something that they are prepared to pay for. This is very close to the leaking bucket game. 
Regardless of any other consequences we value not only our own income, but also to some extent 
the income of others. The economic solution to this problem is to vertically add the individual benefit 
curves into a net social benefit curve from the income distribution and then to find the solution 
where this curve is parallel to the social marginal cost curve, or a market constraint curve (in terms of 
the transfer payments needed), to achieve this particular distribution. 
 
The second way is to think in terms of positive and negative externalities that springs from income 
redistribution. On the negative side we would consider the adverse effects on the work-leisure 
choices by individuals and on the positive side we would consider the positive effects on health, 
education and trust. The total effect on productivity is thus ambiguous. It is easy to imagine that the 
gains are decreasing and the costs are increasing in larger redistribution. In this case we should 
increase the income transfers towards the poor until the marginal gains equal the marginal costs. 
 
Thurow concludes that economic theory can tell us as much about the optimum income distribution, 
as it can about the optimal amount of any other pure public good, which is not much. We simply 
cannot know the exact size of people’s preferences for equality; and the externalities affecting 
productivity, both positively and negatively, are hard to isolate and measure.   
 
3.3 The externalities 
The positive externalities can come in two shapes. Either higher income equality has a direct effect 
on the production of human capital, in which case equality in itself can be regarded as a public good, 
or income inequality leads to underproduction of some other public goods like health insurance or 
public education. Or both. 
While it is truly hard to discriminate between the two effects, evidence of the existence of positive 
externalities from income inequality is brought forward by many. Wilkinson & Pickett (2009) and 
Marmot (2005) show in a number of ways how economic equality seem to be connected to good 
societal outcomes in terms of growth, happiness, knowledge, health, violence and more. Overall 
there seems to be a lot of of empirical evidence that support the notion that higher level of economic 
equality is very efficient in producing benefits, both economic and otherwise, for individuals and 
populations. Thus, if it is not produced in the correct amount on the market, there would be an 
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efficiency case for government intervention to produce more of it. And hence there would be no big 
trade-off. 
3.4 Income distribution and sustainability 
Besides the short to medium run effects on health and growth, a common way to argue against rising 
income inequalities is the long run effects on the social contract and sustainability of a civilized 
society (Molander, 2014 and Östergren, 2012). When inequalities reaches over a certain point, i.e. 
when differences in living conditions between people gets too large, people will no longer feel bound 
by laws and norms of a common society and social disturbances will arise. This is clearly not good 
news for any economy or welfare state. This line of arguing can of course not be tested using short 
time series data, and is perhaps rather a task for economic historians or political scientists. 
If data is collected and made available, the short and medium run effects can be tested using panel 
or time series data. This is what we turn to next. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
Jourmand et al (2008) performed panel data regressions on health status determinants collected in 
the OECD database, to find the various impacts of the determinants. Data on income inequality were 
not included in the model, partly because of data paucity and partly because of skepticism on behalf 
of the authors. In this section I repeat the analysis from Jourmand et al, with the exception that I 
include the GINI-coefficient which is now available in the OECD database. It is available from 2004 
and forth and the analysis will be performed on data stretching from 2004-2011. 
4.1 Data 
The data used here are all gathered from the OECD database and, with the exception of the GINI-
coefficient, it is the same variables that were used in Jourmand et al (2008). They are life expectancy 
at birth (men, women and total) in years, purchase power adjusted GDP per capita expressed in USD 
(income), the share of population with tertiary level examina (education)19, national spending on 
healthcare (private and public) per capita in USD, tobacco consumptions per capita in grams, alcohol 
consumption per capita in liters, consumption of fruits and vegetables per capita in kilos and 
pollution expressed in emissions of nitrogen oxide per capita in kilos. All variables have been shown 
in previous studies to be strongly correlated to population health. An extensive exposition of the 
available evidence is given in Jourmand et al (2008). Here it is sufficient to declare that each variable 
are widely believed to have strong impact on population health. 
To the analysis of Jourmand et al (2008) I add, as previously mentioned, a measure of income 
inequality. It is natural to choose the GINI-coefficient, since it is the measure that is reported in the 
OECD database. The GINI takes on values between 0 and 1 where lower numbers correspond to a 
higher degree of equality. It is, however, not the only measure that has been suggested for income 
inequality. The reader can find a brief discussion on the topic of measurement of income and income 
inequality in appendix 1. 
The time series are not complete over all. Above all is the data on tobacco consumption incomplete, 
since it is reported in grams per capita for some countries, in share of population who are daily 
smokers for some and not at all for a final few. Grams per capita is reported for a small majority of 
the member countries and is therefore chosen here. This means that 19 countries20 are used in the 
main analysis. 
Some time series exhibit some missing data. Where appropriate (where previous and later data 
seems to be following a reasonably stable trend) I have imputed the missing values as the mean 
value of surrounding numbers. Other blanks have been left as is. Regressions have been run with and 
without such imputation without any significant differences in the main results.  
Table 1 summarizes some main characteristics of the data collected 
 
                                                          
19 Jourmand et al (2008) uses share of population with upper secondary degrees as a proxy for education. I use 
tertiary level instead due to data availability. 
20 They are Australia, Czech republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United states. I do not 
find any reason to believe that there are any systematical differences between the groups of countries for 
which tobacco consumption are reported in different ways in the database. 
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Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Life expectancy at 
birth (year) 
79,56 2,44 72,7 83 
Life expectancy at 
birth, men 
76,91 2,71 68,7 80,7 
Life expectancy at 
birth, women 
82,18 2,33 74,8 86,4 
Infant mortality 
(per 1000 births) 
4,48 2,98 0,9 26 
Spending per 
capita (dollars) 
3227 1466 495 8136 
Tertiary degree, 
share of 
population 
31,58 8,88 9,85 46,39 
Tobacco, grams 
per capita 
1602 488,2 660 2760 
Alcohol, litre per 
capita 
9,22 3,08 1,2 13,6 
Fruits and 
vegetables, kg per 
capita 
216,9 56,34 132,9 404,6 
GDP per capita, 
PPP adjusted, 
dollars 
32333 8503 10642 49135 
Emissions of 
nitrogen oxides, 
kg per capita 
30,95 19,77 9,6 93,6 
Income 
inequality, GINI 
coefficient 
0,309 0,0461 0,231 0,43 
Table 1: Data characteristics 
4.2 Estimation strategy 
As mentioned I will use the same model as in Jourmand et al (2008), with the exception that I will 
add the GINI coefficient and use a different time period. My model is thus the following 
𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where indexes i and t refer to country and year. 
HEALTH is a measure of population health, and is measured by life expectancy at birth, in years, for 
men and women. I will also use infant mortality, deaths per 1000 live births as a different measure. 
𝛼𝑖 is a country specific effect that accounts for time-invariant differences across countries. In practice 
it is 19 dummy variables, one for each country included.  
HCR is health care resources, private and public, measured in dollars per capita. 
24 
 
LIFE is a vector of lifestyle factors, containing the variables TOBACCO, ALCOHOL and DIET, with 
TOBACCO being the tobacco consumption, ALCOHOL is the alcohol consumption and DIET is proxied 
by a variable of fruit and vegetable consumption. 
SOCIO is a vector of socioeconomic factors, containing the variables INCOME, INEQUALITY and 
POLLUTION, where income is the GDP per capita, INEQUALITY is measured by the gini coefficient and 
POLLUTION is proxied by the emissions of nitrogen oxides. 
I run generalized least squares panel regressions on the logs of the variables, with corrections for 
heteroscedasticity and error terms following a country-specific AR(1) process. I thereby repeat the 
strategy of Jourmand et al (2008). In this context, the R-squared value is biased and therefore 
irrelevant. Since the variables are in logs, the coefficients should be interpreted as elasticities. 
4.3 Panel data regression with country fixed-effects 
The main purpose of the empirical analysis is to investigate whether the inclusion of country-specific 
fixed effects can help determine whether the weak correlation between income inequality and 
health within the OECD is due to identification problems. The ability to reduce identification 
problems is the main advantage with using panel data21 (Verbeek, 2012, ch 10), compared to a cross-
sectional data set. It is more robust in dealing with omitted variables bias and endogeneity problems 
than cross-sectional data. 
Identification problems can come in different shapes. We may be worried that there is some variable 
missing in our model that affects not only life expectancy, but also one or more of the covariates. 
That would make us either over- or underestimate the effect from those covariates on life 
expectancy. This is the omitted variable problem. The unobservable efficiency and quality of the 
healthcare sector may be such a variable in our model, affecting health as well as spending and 
lifestyle factors. The country-specific effects picks up all the time-invariant variables that affect 
outcome and that is not included in the model. Thus it is robust against (or reduces the effect from) 
such omitted variables bias. The assumption that the unobserved country-specific effect is time 
invariant seems reasonable in general and even more so given the short time span used here. 
We may also worry that 𝛼𝑖 is correlated to one or more of the covariates. This is an endogeneity 
problem, which can be interpreted as heterogeneity between countries in the way an observed 
regressor affects population health, due to unobserved country-specific characteristics. Let’s say that 
the effect of income inequality on health is dependent on the “level of development”, as has been 
suggested. Then the size of 𝛼𝑖will depend on, among other things, national income. This could be 
dealt with using instrumental variables, but it is often hard to find good instruments. We note that 
the country-fixed effects strategy is algebraically the same as estimating in deviations from means 
(Verbeek, 2012, p 377). This can be exploited as a way of providing internal instruments, since the 
transformation of the original variables can be assumed to be uncorrelated to the error term, but 
correlated to the variables themselves (which is what makes a good instrument). Thus, in general, 
the use of country-specific effects eliminates all endogeneity problems related to 𝛼𝑖.  
The main drawback of the fixed effect strategy is that it inflates the problems with measurement 
errors and attenuation to zero (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p 225). Nor does it resolve the issue of 
                                                          
21 Data including multiple observations over both units and time. 
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reversed causality. We may on good grounds believe that it is income inequality that affects health. 
But the estimation strategy chosen here do not per se tell us anything useful of whether this is 
indeed the true direction of the predominant causality. Longitudinal data from a (much) longer 
period of time would better allow us to perform this kind of analysis. 
The estimation strategy chosen here is deliberately chosen to resemble the model in Jourmand et al 
(2008). This makes it very different from most other model strategies in earlier work on income 
inequality. Both in the sense that it uses panel data regression and that it controls for a number of 
covariates not commonly included in previous work. It is therefore a possibly important addition to 
the existing stock of evidence. 
An additional problem may be in separating confounding from mediating. For example if income 
inequality affect education, which affects health, then education is placed somewhere on the 
mediating road from income inequality to health and the inclusion of it will bias the true effects of 
income inequality downwards. However, the level of educational attainment is probably not 
exclusively an effect of the income distribution, so there is probably confounding here as well. The 
inclusion of variables that are likely to be both confounders and mediators is not unproblematic, and 
the line of reasoning is applicable on many of the control variables included. This is another reason 
not to make overly strong claims based on the results provided in the next section. 
4.4 Results 
Main results are presented in table 2. 
Overall we get the expected signs and mostly the coefficients are significant. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the coefficient for smoking is not significant. Income inequality is highly significant, and especially so 
regarding mortality rates among females and infants. On average a one unit rise in the GINI-
coefficient correlates to a 1,9 % (about 1,5 years) fall in life expectancy. For women the fall is 2,3 % 
while for infants the impact on mortality is as large as 45 %(!). Changes in the socioeconomic factors 
have the strongest effects on life expectancy, while lifestyle factors seem less relevant. This is in line 
with the view, and may be an indication of, that lifestyle factors are an important mediating link 
between social determinants of health and actual health outcomes. 
 
Comparing the results in column 1 and 2 (with and without country dummies) highlights the 
importance of the fixed effects strategy. INEQUALITY is highly insignificant in column 1, while 
significant at the 1 % level in column 2. Healthcare spending, education and national income remain 
highly significant throughout all specifications, but the estimated coefficients become smaller when 
country-specific effects are accounted for. 
 
Robustness of the results is checked by running additional regressions (not shown) excluding some 
variable(s) or including time-fixed effects. The results for income inequality remain remarkably stable 
across specifications, while some surprising results appear for some other variables22. The health 
effect for men remains insignificant while there are significant negative effects for females and 
infants. The regression is also run in levels which further confirm the results (except that the 
TOBACCO-variable is positively signed in the level version of the model). Regressions run excluding 
the former communist states do not alter the main results either.  
                                                          
22 The coefficients for life-style factors are not stable over specifications. 
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Dependent variable: Life expectancy at birth, men and women 
No of observations: 137 
(p-values in parenthesis) 
Variable Total Total Men Women Infant 
mortality 
INEQUALITY 
 
 
-0,012 
(0,86) 
-0,019*** 
(0,00) 
0,002 
(0,72) 
-0,023*** 
(0,00) 
0,45**   
(0,02) 
SPENDING 
 
 
0,0042 
(0,24) 
0,022*** 
(0,00) 
0,024*** 
(0,00) 
0,016*** 
(0,02) 
-0,26*** 
(0,00) 
EDUCATION 
 
 
0,051*** 
(0,00) 
0,020*** 
(0,00) 
0,017*** 
(0,00) 
0,025*** 
(0,00) 
-0,20*** 
(0,00) 
GDP 
 
 
0,037*** 
(0,00) 
0,027*** 
(0,00) 
0,036*** 
(0,00) 
0,026*** 
(0,00) 
-0,81*** 
(0,00) 
TOBACCO 
 
 
-0,01  
(0,62) 
-0,001  
(0,749) 
-0,001 
(0,72) 
-0,001 
(0,59) 
0,033    
(0,55) 
ALCOHOL 
 
 
-0,009       
(4,46) 
0,003  
(0,398) 
0,005 
(0,27) 
0,001 
(0,69) 
0,30*** 
(0,00) 
DIET 
 
 
-0,008*** 
(0,007) 
-0,009*** 
(0,00) 
-0,008*** 
(0,00) 
-0,006*** 
(0,00) 
0,052    
(0,27) 
POLLUTION 
 
-0,016*** 
(0,00) 
-0,024*** 
(0,00) 
-0,030*** 
(0,00) 
-0,019*** 
(0,00) 
0,17**   
(0,02) 
      
Controlled for 
country-specific 
effects 
 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***p<0,01 **p<0,05 *p<0,1 
Table 2: Regression results 
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5. Discussion 
I set out to test whether income inequality should be regarded as an important health status 
determinant within the OECD. Basically this is done by extending the model in Jourmand et al (2008) 
by including the GINI-coefficient. This extension was made possible by the inclusion of yearly 
estimates of member country GINI coefficients in the OECD open database. 
In chapter 2 and 3 I have reviewed the theory, the evidence and the implications of a causal relation 
between income inequality and health outcomes and put some extra weight on social capital and 
trust as an important part of the story. While the evidence is hardly unambiguous, I conclude that 
there is most likely something fishy going on in this regard. If I had to put my money somewhere, I 
would gamble on the existence of a causal link running from income inequality, via disinvestment in 
social capital and interpersonal trust to health. 
My results from chapter 4 support the theory that income inequality is an important factor 
explaining health inequalities on the population level. A one unit rise in the GINI-coefficient 
corresponds to a decrease in life expectancy of about 2 percent or 1,5 years.  This is clearly of some 
importance. 
The empirical results do not however, add anything to the ongoing debate of why and how this is so, 
since population level data cannot discriminate between the different theories proposed (as is 
learned by Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 2000 and reviewed in chapter 2). In a sense my results add some 
support to all the hypotheses, since they are all incompatible with the belief that income inequality 
does not matter for health outcomes within the OECD. 
Knowing the mechanism and being able to discriminate between the health effects of increasing 
inequality could be important for policy making. It should be noted, however, that the main issue of 
disagreement in the literature is not generally about the negative correlation between income 
inequality and health, but whether this is caused by something else than concavity in the income-
health relation. Even if it is not, the combination of a negative correlation with the fact that health is 
an important production factor for both individuals and countries make income distribution an 
important consideration for economic policy makers. Increased economic inequalities may not only 
be an ethical problem, it could have adverse effects on growth and development, as is discussed in 
chapter 3. 
Trust and social capital is possibly important factors left out of the model. This is mainly because of 
data paucity. Interpersonal trust levels for countries that can be used for cross-national comparisons 
are not measured on a yearly basis, but in waves and with irregular participation from different 
countries23. It was therefore not meaningful to try to include it here. For two reasons I argue that this 
does not affect the main results. First it is broadly argued in the literature that trust is a relatively 
stable value over time (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002; Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2011). This means that it 
can be assumed that high and low levels of interpersonal trust is picked up by the country-specific 
effects and do not create any omitted variable bias, especially since we are dealing with such a short 
time period. Second it is argued that variations in trust levels are on the mediating link between 
income inequality and health (Kawachi 1997, Uslander 2002). This means that including it might 
                                                          
23 The surveys can be found at the World value survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) and at the European value 
study (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu)  
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cause endogeneity problems and bias the main results. While better data on trust levels over time 
would be desirable, it is probably not a concern for the interpretations of the results of this essay. 
The limitations of this study are plentiful. Data availability is of course the main one. I have studied 
19 countries during a time span of 8 years, which is clearly too small a sample to make any strong 
claims, but still the largest sample available given the data. Although I find no reason to believe that 
differences in reporting data within the OECD is systematically correlated to any factor important to 
this study, selection bias cannot be precluded24. Furthermore, since health is affected by a complex 
and wide range of factors, with causality in many cases running in more than one direction, I run the 
same risk as Jourmand et al (2008) to suffer from endogeneity problems and multicollinearity. 
It should also be noted that many of the variables in the model most likely affect health outcomes 
with a lag. This could mean that the model should include lagged independent variables, rather than 
present. The short time period make such an attempt less meaningful. We must in this case view 
present values as proxies for earlier values, which is arguably reasonable to some extent. 
Despite the limitations, the results do shed doubt on earlier claims that income inequality is not an 
important health status determinant within the OECD. It seems that the weak correlations in cross-
sectional data between the GINI coefficient and life expectancy within the OECD are at least partly 
the cause of identification problems and country-specific heterogeneity and that the use of 
longitudinal data is important in this regard. This result is also in line with the conclusions of Karlsson 
et al (2010). 
Further research will use longer time series and larger samples to create stronger results. With larger 
and better data it will also use different modelling to overcome some of the econometrical problems 
sketched out above. But most importantly we need answers that cannot be given by macro data. We 
need more studies using individual longitudinal data on income and health, which still emphasize a 
cross-country perspective. It seems highly likely that the health effects of income inequality are not 
homogenous across country and cultural borders. 
 
  
                                                          
24 This aside from the fact that OECD members is not a random draw of countries. This study, however, is 
explicitly performed within this context. 
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Appendix 1 – some conceptual issues 
 
Measuring income inequality 
 
To measure income inequality one first have to measure income and then find a way to express the 
distribution of this income in a way that makes it possible to compare different distributions with 
each other, preferably a summary statistic. Both of these steps contain conceptual issues to be aware 
of and that may affect the value of any conclusions drawn based on those numbers. 
 
Income can either be measured in a survey or by extracting data from national records. A survey can 
suffer from selection bias and from the fact that many people simply do not know their exact 
earnings. The national record on income is often collected from tax registers and may miss 
information on income that is not taxable. Furthermore income that is not monetary is seldom 
reported; not least the income from owned housing is hard to include (Deininger and Squire, 1996). 
 
Next one must consider the income period and unit. Should we measure individual income or 
household income? It is not clear-cut, but without income one will probably be worse off living alone 
than in a household also including one or several wage earners. So household income divided on its 
residents is probably the best way to go. Annual income can be misleading if one consider a life-cycle 
perspective. Income can vary considerably over a lifetime and specifically, annual income may in 
many cases not give a good approximation of economic resources available to a household or a 
person (DeSilver, 2013). Accumulated wealth and credit availability should probably be considered as 
well or perhaps a measure of lifetime income should be used. 
 
Different ways of collecting information and defining income in different countries can seriously 
impair the usefulness of the results for measuring inequality in general and for comparisons between 
countries. All the OECD data on income inequality is based on annual income after tax and transfers 
on the household level. They are therefore comparable. But they do differ in the way data is 
collected and may be affected by different tax laws and legal systems. For our sample of 19 countries 
the metadata is collected in the following manner: 
 
For Czech Republic, Iceland and Ireland data is extracted from the “EU survey of income and living 
conditions”. 
For Norway and Denmark the data is collected from national registers. 
For the remaining 14 countries the data is collected from national surveys on income and living 
conditions. 
 
The above calls for some caution in the interpretation of the numbers. 
 
The GINI coefficient 
 
The GINI coefficient is the most popular measure of income inequality. For that reason alone it is the 
most practical measure to use in any empirical study, simply because of data availability. The GINI is 
based on the Lorenz curve, which maps share of total income on cumulative shares of total 
population. This can be seen in figure 9. The x-axis is the cumulative share of the total number of 
individuals or households in the population ordered by their share of total income from lowest to 
highest and. The y-axis is the share of total income in percent. If everyone have the same income 
(absolute equality), the “poorest” x % of the population will always earn exactly  x % of total income 
and the corresponding Lorenz curve will be the “line of equality”, which is the 45 degree straight line 
in the figure. If income is not equally distributed the Lorenz curve will be below the line of equality 
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and if inequality is absolute (one person holds 100 % of all income) the Lorenz curve will coincide 
with the x-axis and the vertical line to the right in the figure. 
 
To compare different distributions it is convenient to have one simple summary statistic. One way of 
collecting such a statistic is to compute the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality. 
Multiply this area with 2 and we will have a number that varies conveniently from 0 to 1, with 1 
corresponding to maximum inequality. This is the definition of the GINI coefficient25. Intuitively the 
wider the gap between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve, the more unequal is the distribution of 
income and the higher the GINI statistic. 
 
 
Figure 9: The Lorenz curve. From RBA (2012) 
 
Figure 9 is collected from the bulletin from the Reserve Bank of Australia and is the actual Lorenz 
curves computed for income and wealth distributions in Australia 201026. Note that accumulated 
wealth is more unevenly distributed than annual income, which is a common result. 
 
Other measures of income inequality 
 
The downside of an aggregate measure such as the GINI coefficient is that it cannot tell us anything 
about the shape of the Lorenz curve and hence about the plausible different kinds of inequalities. It is 
perfectly possible for inequalities in different parts of the income distribution to cause intersecting 
and quite differently shaped Lorenz curves but still produce very similar GINI statistics. This is a 
potential problem since it is also possible for different kinds of inequalities to have different effects 
                                                          
25 One can also divide the area with the total area under the line of equality. But this is just dividing with 0,5, 
which amount to the same thing. Computing the area could be cumbersome, and it can be shown that the GINI 
can also be calculated using this formula (Creedy, 1996):  𝐺 = 1 +
1
𝑁
− (
2
𝑁2
)∑ (𝑁 + 1 − 𝑖)(
𝑦𝑖
?̅?
)𝑁𝑖=1   
where N is the size of the population, i is the i:th unit in the population ordered by income, 𝑦𝑖 is the income of 
the i:th person and ?̅? is the income mean of the population. 
26 It is based on the panel survey HILDA = Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia  
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on health and other outputs. Indeed redistribution from the upper class to the middle class would 
probably have different effects than redistribution from the middle class to the lower class, but GINI 
changes could be the same.  
 
Therefore a wide range of other measures have been suggested and used in several studies. They are 
briefly summarized in Maio (2007) and the vast majority aim to pick up some information about the 
shape of the distribution as well as the size of the inequality. The Atkinson index includes a sensitivity 
parameter (ϵ) that is meant to mirror some value judgment on the kind of inequality present. The 
higher ϵ the more concern is directed to those at the bottom of the income distribution. The 
interpretation of the Atkinson index is, given some assumption of the size of the preferences for 
equality, the share of total income that would be sufficient to produce the same amount of social 
welfare as present, if it were equally distributed27. 
 
Computing decile (or quintile or percentile) ratios are another way of describing the income 
inequality. It is simply to divide the top income decile with the bottom decile for a given population. 
Then it is possible to compare correlations between different ratios such as 10:90 and 30:70 to 
perhaps find essential information on the importance of the shape of the distribution for certain 
outputs. 
 
The Generalised entropy index (GE), like the Atkinson index includes a sensitivity parameter with 
lower values for higher concern for those at the bottom of the distribution. The GE value ranges from 
0 (perfect equality) to infinity. 
 
The Robin Hood index measures the maximum vertical distance from the line of equality to the 
Lorenz curve and is interpreted as the income that has to be transferred from those above the mean 
to those below the mean to achieve an equal distribution. 
 
Other important measures from the literature are the Coefficient of variation (CV), the Kakwani 
progressivity index, the proportion of total income earned and the Sen poverty measure. 
 
Maio (2007) concludes that the use of several different measures can help to nuance the discussion 
of the effects of income inequality and possibly help to solve some disagreements in the matter. 
Especially if results are sensitive to the shape of distribution, not picked up by the GINI-coefficient. 
                                                          
27 An Atkinson index of 0,2 thus means that (1-0,2=) 80% of total income would produce the same amount of 
social welfare if equally distributed. 
